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The enactment of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) 2005, with its 
rights-based approach through a time-bound employment guarantee and legal framework, 
has marked a paradigm shift not only from other wage-employment programmes hitherto 
pursued in India, but also from neo-liberal reforms undertaken since 1991. The Act came 
into force on 2 February 2006 and was implemented in a phased manner. In Phase I it was 
introduced in 200 of the most backward districts of the country; Phase II added another 130 
districts in 2007-08; and in Phase III the scheme was further extended to the remaining 274 
rural districts of India from 1 April 2008.  
 
The demand-driven approach of NREGA ensures that adult members of a rural household 
willing to do any public-related unskilled manual work at the statutory minimum wage are 
provided a legal guarantee for 100 days of employment for each financial year. If the State 
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government fails to provide work within 15 days of application being made, the applicant is 
entitled to an unemployment allowance.  
 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) requires that a Perspective 
Plan, concerned mainly with water conservation, minor irrigation, land development and 
rural connectivity, is to be prepared for whole districts to provide a Shelf of Possible Projects 
to be taken up under the scheme as and when demand for work arises. The Act is also a 
significant vehicle for strengthening decentralization and deepening the process of 
democracy by giving a pivotal role to the Panchayati Raj Inststitutions (PRIs) in planning 
(Panchayats at District, Intermediate and Village levels are the principal authorities for 
planning); monitoring (a regular social audit of all works within the jurisdiction of each 
Panchayat is expected to be carried out by the Gram Sabha1); and implementation.  
 
Low level of absorption of labour in rural India 
According to the 11th Planning Commission’s (2007-12) estimate 27.5% of the total 
population of India live below the poverty line, and about 73% of these poor live in rural 
areas and are primarily small and marginal farmers. A number of studies indicate that over 
the past few decades the capacity of the agricultural sector to absorb labour has gone down 
due to sharp decline in public investment in rural infrastructure such as irrigation. 
Consequently, there has been a steady decrease in the per capita output of agriculture, which 
necessitates a massive increase in public investment in rural India. The annual rate of growth 
of rural employment was around 0.5% per annum between 1993-94 to 1999-2000 as 
compared to 1.7% per annum between 1983-84 and 1993-94. Also the current daily status 
unemployment rate in rural areas increased from 5.63% in 1993-94 to 7.21% in 1999-00 
(Chakraborty 2007, p.5). However, as shown by the 2001 Census data provided by the 
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), the number of marginal workers grew 
significantly in the countryside in the 1990s when compared to the 1980s, hence the problem 
is not merely related to outright unemployment, but also under-employment. Rural labourers 
are forced to work for very low wages in the non-formal sector. The deceleration of rural 
employment growth was further reinforced by a sharp cutback in public spending on rural 
employment programmes. Direct expenditure on these programmes was 0.2% of GDP in 
                                                           
1 A twice-yearly meeting of eligible voters (adults aged 18 years or more) in each Panchayat. 
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1996-97, but only 0.13% of GDP in 2001. It increased to 0.40% in 2002-03 but again 
declined to 0.33% in 2006-07 (Chakraborty 2007, p. 17). This situation demanded providing 
a safety net to rural communities in the form of guaranteed employment through a 
programme like NREGA. But as well as ensuring rural employment, productivity 
enhancement in rural communities is also necessary to generate secondary benefits and 
improve the rural economy's ability to absorb labour.  
 
Criticism of NREGA to date  
NREGA has thus far received two broad types of criticisms. Firstly, pro-market liberals tend 
to denigrate the Act itself on the grounds that NREGA will accelerate excessive fiscal 
deficits on the one hand, and encourage corruption on the other. Secondly, other groups 
including advocates of NREGA, feel that it will actually crowd out private investment, 
particularly in agriculture, and can only lay the foundations for non-inflationary growth in 
the medium term if it is accompanied by substantial upgrading of rural infrastructure. These 
groups feel that the government has so far been approaching the NREGA as purely a wage-
employment programme thus negating the development potential of the Act. Furthermore, 
they argue that there should be no trade-off between expenditures on providing legal rights to 
rural employment and upgrading infrastructure, but rather that they are complementary. 
  
Furthermore, the three pillars of the rights-based approach of NREGA (a legal guarantee of 
100 days of rural employment, a statutory minimum wage, and ensuring unemployment 
allowances) seemed to be at stake when the 2007 report of the Comptroller of Auditor 
General (CAG) – the most extensive assessment of the implementation of the scheme so far 
– highlighted serious procedural lapses in its implementation. These included lack of 
adequate administrative and technical manpower in rural local governments that adversely 
affected the preparation of plans, scrutiny, approval, monitoring and measurement of work 
done, as well as lack of maintenance of the stipulated records at Gram Panchayat level. 
Absence of recorded dates of applications for work under NREGA, as CAG observed, made 
it difficult to establish entitlements to employment allowances and also to verify the 
provision of the work within the legal guarantee of 100 days.  
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Poor quality of works taken under NREGS 
Many studies indicate that giving preference to employment creation over the creation of 
durable productive assets under NREGS seems to have resulted in poor quality works, 
increasing numbers of incomplete projects and very low levels of maintenance. This is 
exacerbated by inadequate technical support for the scheme and poorly designed 
implementation strategies: “…the emphasis is more on spending a large amount of money 
than on ensuring quality in works execution” (Ambasta et al. 2008, p. 44). For example, tree-
planting may be done under NREGS but no provision made for watering nor any protection 
planned against grazing (ibid., p. 44). Similarly, water-harvesting structures have been 
created under NREGS without any provision for catchment protection, and eventually most 
of these have silted up beyond repair (CSE 2008, p. 43). 
 
Moreover, with a view to generating more workdays and creating labour-intensive projects, 
the Act bans the use of machines and the commissioning of contractors, who tend to do most 
work using labour-displacing machinery. The Act also requires a 60:40 ratio of wages to 
materials costs. Many observers feel that compliance with this strict norm for each project, 
along with the restriction on the use of machinery, has led to problems with respect to the 
generation of durable assets. The study undertaken by CSE (2008 p. 42) observed that about 
80 percent of the assets created under the Act are not providing sustainable benefits. 
 
Another problem is that there is no compulsion on implementing agencies under NREGA to 
actually complete a project. Thus local governments start labour intensive projects to meet 
demands for job creation but many of them are abandoned midway. Many feel that instead of 
opening up new projects, it is more important to complete existing works within a set 
timeframe. In 2006-07, 53.7% of the total number of schemes under NREGA remained 
incomplete. Respective figures for the financial years 2007-08 and 2008-09 are 54.1% and 
56.1% as evidenced from the table below. 
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 Financial Year  
2006-07 
Financial Year  
2007-08 
Financial Year  
2008-09* 
Number of Districts Involved 200 330 615 
Employment Provided: 
Person Days per Household 
43 days 42 days 47 days 
Total Number of Works (In 
Lakhs) 
835,000 1,788,000 2,643,000 
% Works Completed  46.3% 45.9%  43.9%  
Type of Works 
Water Conservation 54% 49% 45% 
Irrigation Facility  10%) 15% 20% 
Rural Connectivity 21% 17% 18% 
Land Development 11% 16% 15% 
Other 4% 3% 0.93% 
*Provisional results to March 2009 
Source: Guidelines on Convergence with National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, 2009, New Delhi 
(website: http://www.nrega.nic.in)  
 
Need and scope for convergence 
As noted above, interested parties have asked whether the success of the Act should only be 
measured in terms of work days provided to rural households, or whether more emphasis 
should be placed on creating productive and durable assets which would in turn ensure long 
term rural employment. They argue that the government should ensure better coordination 
between line departments and with other funding schemes with a view to complementing 
NREGS with additional mechanized work. For example, non-engineered brick soling roads 
created under NREGS could be metalled with engineering inputs by linking the scheme with 
Pradhan Mantri Gtram Sadak Yojna (PMGSY), the Prime Minister’s Rural Road Project. 
  
The Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) does in fact appear to have realized that 
NREGS with its inter-sectoral approach has the potential for convergence with other 
departments like the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR), Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoE&F), Department of Land Resources, Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ministry 
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of Human Resources, and the Ministry of Women and Child Development. There is also 
scope to converge with schemes like PMGSY, the National Afforestation Programme 
(NAP), Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme (AIBP), Farmers Participation Action 
Research Programme (FPARP) and the Common Area Development and Water Management 
Programme (CAD& WM). Such linkages could create a ‘second generation’ NREGS that 
effectively creates durable assets. Inter-sectoral convergence would also add value through 
resource and activity synergies as well as infusion of technological inputs and professional 
quality in planning and implementation (MoRD, 2009). 
 
Given the current situation of a plethora of schemes with similar activities, there is a great 
need to rationalize their planning and implementation to avoid duplication and redundancy. 
A convergence model, as conceptualised by MoRD (2009) would draw together existing 
schemes and resources, rather than create a new scheme with additional resources, thus 
optimizing public investment and achieving shared objectives. For example, convergence 
between NREGA and ongoing programmes like PMGSY could be instrumental in achieving 
the goal of the Rural Development Plan: Vision 2025 (prepared by MoRD) to provide proper 
connectivity to all villages across the country. 
 
Similarly, convergence between NREGA and the National Afforestation Programme (NAP) 
would be mutually beneficial. MoE&F has set the target of one third of the country’s land 
area under forest or tree plantations, as envisaged in the National Forest Policy, 1988. This 
cannot be accomplished by the MoE&F alone due to the volume of manpower and other 
resources required for the task, some of which could be provided through NREGS. 
 
Also, there are several programmes of MoWR being implemented across the country that 
involve works similar or complementary to NREGA projects. MoWR has identified a gap 
between the irrigation potential being created and that utilized because many irrigation 
projects have been operating below their potential due to inadequate maintenance. This has 
resulted in the problem of low efficiency of water usage and low productivity. Integration 
with NREGS could ensure better maintenance of projects implemented by MoWR.  
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How inter-sectoral convergence could function 
According to MoRD’s proposals, NREGA works are expected to become a subset of all 
those other programmes which have a kuccha (earthworks) component and which require a 
large labour force, particularly semi-skilled and unskilled labour. For example, through 
convergence with the Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme (AIBP), earthworks such 
as embankment construction and minor irrigation schemes, along with other labour intensive 
work, could be carried out under NREGS, while works requiring machines can be executed 
under AIBP. The timing of kuccha works under convergence should be planned taking into 
account the agriculture lean season when participation in the NREGA workforce is high. 
Convergence of works could be affected in several ways:  
• Gap filling e.g. roadside planting along roads constructed under PMGSY. 
• Dovetailing inputs into common projects identified through the NREGA 
Perspective Plan.  
• Area-based complementary projects, e.g. NREGS could fund supplementary 
roadworks in an area to link villages that cannot be connected under the PMGSY, 
which allows for only limited rural connectivity.  
• Value addition to NREGA works e.g. metalling roads built under NREGS through 
PMGSY 
• Technical support for ensuring quality in planning, selection and execution of 
NREGS works e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) can provide a database for the 
selection of appropriate works in a particular area at the planning stage along with 
quality enhancing technologies/technical support at the design and execution stages 
under NREGS. 
 
The convergence model can thus provide a basis for sustainable development, as shown in 
the flow chart below. 
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Productivity and Skill Enhancement: 
The water harvesting systems built through NREGA can help in irrigating farm 
lands, increasing crop productions, soul conservations rejuvenating forests and 
grasslands to support dairy development and fisheries. 
Value Addition to NREGA Works: 
This can be done in two ways:  
*consolidating works done under NREGA,  
i.e. Kuccha to Pucca (concrete structure),  
roads, ponds and canals; and  
*enriching and expanding the potential use/spin-off benefits of NREGA works. 
Entry Point NREGA Kuccha Works (Earthen Structure)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increasing Market Linkages: 
Enhanced productivity and skills are likely to encourage market linkages. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Over the past few decades the capacity of the agricultural sector to absorb rural labour has 
declined due in part to a sharp reduction in public investment in rural infrastructure. In this 
situation, NREGA was introduced with its right-based framework to offer an employment 
guarantee to the rural poor. However, some critics feel that to date the government has been 
approaching NREGA purely as a wage- employment programme, thus negating its 
development potential and giving preference to employment generation over the creation of 
durable productive assets generation. But these two objectives must be seen as 
complementary. Studies have shown that there is a quite distinct and positive relationship 
between rural infrastructure development and the reduction of rural poverty through 
increases in wages and household income, income per acre of field crop, and non-
agricultural employment. According to an estimate made by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) for each additional Rs.1 million invested in roads, 165 people 
would be lifted above the poverty line (IFPRI, 1999, p. 39).  
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In this context, an inter-sectoral convergence model has been advanced by the Ministry of 
Rural Development. Successful pursuance of this convergence model is expected to create 
huge potential for upgrading, renovating and creating sustainable rural infrastructure on a 
massive scale that has not so far been undertaken in India. NREGA would thus be positioned 
not as an old style welfare programme, but rather a development initiative to create durable 
assets across a wide range of works. It remains to be seen to what extent this model of 
convergence between NREGS and other existing schemes of various line departments can 
deliver the expected boost to rural infrastructure.  
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